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Incentive or impediment? The impact of capacity
mechanisms on storage plants
Katrin Schmitz∗, Bjarne Steﬀen, Christoph Weber.
April 28, 2013
Abstract
Capacity remuneration mechanisms are a widespread instrument to foster investment.
The growing interest in electricity storage raises the question how these mechanisms inter-
act with storage plants. Using a stylized capacity planning model, we demonstrate that
an exclusion of storage plants from capacity mechanisms leads to welfare losses. Even if
storages are not explicitly excluded, the setup of capacity mechanisms can discriminate
storage implicitlywe therefore discuss typical mechanism design parameters and their
impact on storage plants. Three case studies describe the actual situation of storage plants
in the PJM system, Ireland and Spain. Finally the ﬁndings are summarized to general
principles for storage-compatible capacity mechanisms.
Keywords: capacity market, pumped-hydro storage, power plant investment
JEL classiﬁcation: L51, L52, L94, Q41, Q42, Q48
1 Introduction
Being the most prevalent form of energy, a reliable supply of electricity is of utmost
importance for industrialized economies. A prerequisite for this is an adequate generation
park, able to meet the load at any point in time. In many European countries, large
thermal units will soon be decommissioned due to their highly polluting emissions, and
the large-scale integration of wind and solar power requires increasingly ﬂexible plants
as a complement. Consequently, new power plants have to be constructed, especially
in countries that also decided to phase-out their nuclear ﬂeet following the Fukushima
incident. Some markets (e.g., Germany) are still characterized by overcapacities that
serve as a buﬀer, but generation adequacy might well become an area of concern in the
medium term.
In liberalized electricity markets, the available plant park is the result of investment
decisions made by individual market participants. As economic theory shows, the ag-
gregate of individual investments yields a socially eﬃcient plant park under certain con-
ditionsmost importantly, wholesale prices have to serve as eﬃcient signals (cf. e.g.,
Joskow and Tirole 2007). In reality, though, electricity prices are capped or distorted and
do not necessarily cover the capital costs of power plants. Therefore, among other rea-
sons, many countries do not rely on 'energy only' markets but have implemented capacity
∗Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: katrin.schmitz@uni-due.de, steﬀen.bjarne@stud.uni-due.de,
christoph.weber@uni-due.de. Postal address (all authors): University of Duisburg-Essen, Universitaetstrasse
12, 45117 Essen, Germany.
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remuneration mechanisms in order to ensure an adequate amount of available generation
capacity.
To date, capacity mechanisms primarily address thermal generation technologies, espe-
cially those that are characterized by comparably low investment costs and short start-up
times. Apart from maintenance outages, thermal plants are generally available, resulting
in a high capacity credit. In contrast, the availability of electricity storage plants is lim-
ited by the amount of stored energy in the reservoirsa drawback compared to thermal
plants. In the light of ambitious targets to reduce carbon emissions of power generation,
though, storage plants are increasingly considered as an alternative way to secure gener-
ation adequacy, despite their operating restrictions and higher capital costs. The most
important technology is pumped-hydro storage, with 95 GW installed capacity worldwide
and several GW being under construction (Deane et al., 2010). Pumped-hydro storage
plants are likely to grow in importance especially in systems where the feed-in from ﬂuc-
tuating renewable energy sources exceeds the load in certain moments: In those cases,
storage capacities add to an eﬃcient power system both by CO2-free electricity generation
in situations with low wind and solar power, and by absorbing the excess generation in
times of high wind/solar radiation and low load.
As the development of pumped-hydro storage plants re-gains momentum, it is of great
importance how capacity mechanisms address the speciﬁc characteristics of storage plants:
Capacity payments might contribute signiﬁcantly to cover the high capital costs that are
typical for pumped-hydro plants, creating an incentive to extent storage capacity. At
the same time, capacity mechanisms are complex market interventions with the potential
to distort the cost position of diﬀerent generation technologies, which might ultimately
impede investments into 'discriminated' technologies. At the time of writing this arti-
cle, capacity mechanism regulation is in ﬂux in many European markets (e.g., France,
Germany, UK), resulting in signiﬁcant uncertainty concerning the impact on storage in-
vestments. The situation in Germany serves as an example: Relying historically on an
'energy only' setup, the introduction of a capacity remuneration mechanism is vigorously
discussed, while more than 4 GW new pumped-hydro storage plants are planned but in-
vestment decisions are pending (Steﬀen 2012). The present article shows that the design
of capacity mechanisms can have a signiﬁcant impact on storage investment decisions
and overall power system eﬃciencywhich is why we argue that these eﬀects have to be
taken into account carefully in order to design capacity mechanisms that do not distort
the cost-eﬃcient generation mix.
Based on the variety of capacity mechanisms implemented in diﬀerent countries, nu-
merous articles present possible setups of capacity mechanisms and discuss the appropri-
ateness of design parameters (e.g., Joskow 2008, Battle and Rodilla 2010, Cramton and
Ockenfels 2012). To our knowledge, however, the speciﬁc situation of storage plants has
not yet been addressed in detail. Ruester et al. (2012), Sioshansi et al. (2012) and Steﬀen
(2012) discuss the general regulatory environment for storage plants in Europe and the
U.S., but do not speciﬁcally address the consequences of capacity mechanisms. This is
where we add to the literature.
The next section starts with a brief discussion of the rationale for capacity mecha-
nisms. In section 3, a stylized numerical model is used to demonstrate the welfare eﬀects
of capacity mechanisms that exclude storage plants or not. An assessment of typical de-
sign parameters in section 4 underlines that depending on the speciﬁc design of capacity
mechanisms, storage plants are possibly 'discriminated' in a way that they are no longer
considered as investment alternative. Three case studies illustrate the current situation for
storage plants in the U.S. East Coast PJM system, Ireland and Spain. Finally, section 5
summarizes general principles for storage-compatible capacity mechanisms and concludes.
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2 Market eﬃciency and capacity mechanisms
The design of electricity wholesale markets has to target not only the eﬃcient dispatch
in the short run, but also to motivate necessary investments. Many authors have shown
that in theory, energy spot markets are able to provide cost-covering rents for the eﬃcient
portfolio of generation technologies and adequate price signals for investments (cf. e.g.,
Joskow and Tirole 2007, Schweppe et al. 1982, Stoft 2002). This holds as long as prices
rise to a scarcity level (reﬂecting the value of lost load VOLL) when the load exceeds
the available capacity (cf. Joskow 2008, de Vries 2004). But if capacity is adequate, spot
prices are too low to motivate investments in new generation capacity (cf. Cramton and
Ockenfels 2012). Assuming perfect competition, power plants bid into the market with
their marginal production costs as their investment costs are already sunk. Following
the merit order, prices are set by the marginal production costs of the last power plant
needed to satisfy demand. While at peak times base load plants earn rents above their
own marginal production costs (namely in the amount of the marginal production costs of
the peak load technology), the marginal peak load plant earns just its marginal production
costs and has therefore no possibility to cover its investment costs. In competitive markets,
capacity has no positive value unless capacity is scarce (cf. Cramton and Ockenfels 2012).
There are further reasons why 'energy only' markets might not lead to eﬃcient solu-
tions. Electricity demand is typically not ﬂexible enough to respond adequately and there
is a time gap between capacity investment decisions and commissioning, which could make
market clearing impossible in situations of scarcity. Especially in periods of scarcity a few
'remaining' suppliers might have substantial market power. Moreover, spiking prices could
be considered as unacceptable by the public and regulators, which turns it unlikely that
investments are made relying on the occurrence of scarcity prices in the future. In sum,
additional reliable revenues might be required to ensure generation.
Coming from the (more technical) reliability perspective, energy spot markets should
set adequate incentives to ensure an eﬃcient security of supply level (cf. e.g., Hogan 2005,
Joskow 2008 an Finon et al. 2008). Nowadays the question of security of supply is increas-
ingly becoming a focus of economic and political debate. Especially in RES-dominated
energy systems, investors have to be found to build power plants only running in those
hours in which sun and/or wind are low.1 But to make such investments attractive to
investors the market has to set the right price signals. During scarcity conditions spot
prices have to be high enough to provide cost-covering rents. Hogan (2005) argues that
the 'missing money' problem results mainly from price caps as those prevent prices from
reaching cost-covering price levels (for new power plants) within scarcity periods. But
highly volatile prices, rising up in scarcity hours very high seem to be 'politically not fea-
sible'. He demonstrates that the missing investment incentives could also be set through
a re-conﬁguration of 'energy-only' markets: "The main innovations of the energy-only
market design would be in the conﬁguration of the reserve demand curves, connection
to the average VOLL, and elimination of de facto price caps" (Hogan, 2005, p. 6). As
he argues, regulatory interventions would still be needed (e.g., to prevent the exercise of
market power) but their character would be substantially changed. One the one hand,
short-term security could be suﬃciently ensured by operation reserves markets where the
system operator describes the reserve requirements. On the other hand, reserve markets
cannot solve the question for strategic expansion policy as Battle and Rodilla (2010) term
the not security-related dimension of the 'missing money' problem. Strategic expansion
policy means for them a very long-term dimension including the diversiﬁcation of fuel
and the technology mix of generation which can only be addressed by the implementa-
tion of speciﬁc capacity mechanisms (e.g., administrative capacity payments or a trade
1Statistically, wind and sun energy production compensate each other to a certain extent especially with a
suitable large geographical scope.
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mechanism).2
While so far we referred to capacity mechanisms in general, very diﬀerent setups have
been implemented in practice, resulting in varying degrees of market intervention. The
impact of diﬀerent setups on storage plants is discussed in the following, starting with
a stylized modeling of the most important apparent question: Inclusion or exclusion of
storage plants from capacity payments.
3 Capacity payments, cost coverage and welfare eﬀects
The motivation for capacity mechanisms and their impact on storage plants can be il-
lustrated consistently by means of a numerical example. This approach is inspired by
Joskow (2008) who discusses the 'missing money' problem of an eﬃcient thermal plant
park derived through peak-load-pricing theory. The classical peak-load-pricing model has
been extended by Steﬀen and Weber (2013) to include storage plants; in this section we
apply their model to discuss textbook case capacity mechanisms. Explaining the intuition
of the model (for a formal treatment, the reader is referred to Steﬀen and Weber 2013),
we proceed in three steps: First, the long-term eﬃcient portfolio of generic generation
technologies (including storage) is derived. Second, cost coverage in 'energy only' mar-
kets with and without price caps is analyzed, following the approach of Joskow (2008),
but including storage. Third, we go a step further by considering two generic capacity
payment schemes and deriving their implications for storage investments as well as total
system costs.
3.1 Eﬃcient generation portfolio
As the adequacy of available generation capacity depends on power plant investment
decisions, a long-term perspective is required. We therefore start with the derivation
of the long-term eﬃcient generation portfolio from a system point of view, abstracting
from any legacy plants. While the calculations are illustrative, we use load data from
Germany, a liberalized market in which the introduction of a capacity mechanism is
vigorously discussed and new pumped-storage plants have been proposed.3
The chronological load curve for a typical week in 2011 is shown in ﬁgure 1a. Given the
instantaneous feed-in of wind and solar power, we subtract their generation from the total
load, leading to the residual load that has to be met by controllable plants. The chrono-
logical residual load curve exhibits the current weekly pattern in Germany where storage
plants are usually operated in day-night cycles on weekdays but not on weekends (leading
to approximately 260 cycles per year). Re-arranging the hours by magnitude yields the
residual load duration curve (LDC) that is the basis for the subsequent discussion (ﬁgure
1b). To simplify matters, we ignore uncertainty and take the curve as given.
To meet the residual load, three generic technologies are considered: A controllable
base technology (one could think of coal-ﬁred plants), a generic peak technology (e.g.,
gas-ﬁred plants) and a storage technology (e.g., pumped-hydro storage). All technologies
are characterized by linear ﬁxed and variable costs as described in table 1. The storage
technology converts energy with a round-trip eﬃciency of 80%, costs occur both for tur-
bines/pumps and the reservoir. While the demand is generally assumed to be inelastic,
we allow the load to be reduced in super-peak hours at very high costs that occur to
disconnected customers (a.k.a. the VOLL).4
2See Stoft (2002) for a diﬀerentiation of reserve and capacity markets
3Hourly total load values provided by ENTSO-E; hourly wind and solar feed-in values based on statu-
tory publications from 50Hertz Transmission GmbH, Amprion GmbH, TransnetBW GmbH and TenneT TSO
GmbH.
4For the illustrative purpose of the calculation, demand reduction costs are also assumed to be linear.
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Figure 1: Load and load duration curves for Germany
Fixed costsa Variable costs Round-trip eﬃciency
e/MW e/MWhb e/MWh kWhout/kWhin
Base 150,000 30
Storage 80,000 5,000  80%
Peak 50,000 100
Demand reduction 0 3,000
a
Annualized
b
Reservoir size dependent costs
Table 1: Technical parameters of stylized technology portfolio
Given the LDC and the technology characteristics, the eﬃcient generation portfolio
follows from a cost trade-oﬀ: There is an annual operating time from which on the base
technology is most economic, as its low operating costs make up for its high ﬁxed costsin
the present example, base plants are the cheapest solution for units that run at least 2619
hours a year (see table 2). Consequently, the value of the LDC at 2619 hours gives the
eﬃcient capacity of 54.90 GW base plantspart of this capacity will run 8760 hours a year,
and another part has lower run times with 2619 hours being the minimum. The eﬃcient
capacity of the other technologies is derived along the same cost trade-oﬀs between the
respective merit-order neighbors. For the storage technology, operating costs are thereby
driven by additional base-load generation that is used to ﬁll-up the reservoir, round-trip
losses and reservoir-size dependent costs (see Steﬀen and Weber (2013) for details).
The cost-eﬃcient plant park for the given LDC is summarized in table 2. In this
stylized system, the lion's share of total capacity is of base technology with 54.90 GW,
alongside 7.88 GW of storage plants and 8.25 GW of peak units. In the 17 hours with
the highest demand, it is most eﬃcient to reduce the load from the demand side, so that
up to 2.67 GW load are 'covered' by demand reductions.
3.2 Cost coverage and the 'missing money' problem
While the generation portfolio derived above is eﬃcient from a system point of view, it
does not necessarily follow that the portfolio is reached in liberalized power markets where
the available plant park is a result of decentralized investment decisions. We therefore
evaluate whether the earnings of plant operators in competitive power markets cover their
costs, which would imply suﬃcient incentives to invest into capacities.
To start with, an ideal 'energy only' wholesale electricity market is looked at (Case A).
Following merit-order based pricing, hourly electricity prices are set by the variable costs
of the marginal technology, i.e. the cheapest technology that is not yet running at full
capacity. As long as the load is less than or equal to the available base capacity of 54.90
5
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Capacity Reservoir Annual run time Total generation Total costs
GW GWh h GWh eM
Base 54.90 26198760 426,958a 20,595
Storage 7.88 45.96b 6942618 11,949 1,309c
Peak 8.25 18693 2,228 635
Dem. red. 2.67 117 14 41
a
Including 14,937 GWh base technology generation to ﬁll-up the storage reservoir
b
Annual storage cycles: 260
c
Storage covers variable costs for base technology generation that is used to ﬁll-up the reservoir
Table 2: Eﬃcient energy system
GW, the base plant sets the price (6142 hours). For 1925 hours, the storage technology is
marginal, and for 676 hours the electricity price rises to the variable costs of peak plants.
In the 17 super-peak hours the generation system is already operated at full capacity and
the electricity price jumps up to the value of lost load (i.e. demand reductions are required
to ensure the balance of supply and demand). As there is a single electricity price for
every hour, all technologies proﬁt from the scarcity prices in these hours.
The earnings of each technology are compared with the respective total costs in table 3
(Case A). In line with the theory of eﬃcient wholesale electricity markets (e.g., Joskow and
Tirole 2007), all technologies are able to cover ﬁxed and variable costs with the revenues
from energy sales, hence the total cost-eﬃcient generation portfolio is feasible in an ideal
'energy only' market.
In practice, though, electricity wholesale markets are typically not ideal. As pointed
out in section 2, it might be the case that regulators do not allow energy prices to rise
up to the eﬃcient scarcity price level (e/MWh 3000 in our example). Case B in table
3 therefore exhibits the consequences for the case that energy prices are capped, which
means that they are not allowed to rise above the variable costs of the peak technology
(e/MWh 100). While this price cap is binding in only 17 hours, all technologies clearly fail
to cover their costs. The smaller the number of annual run hours, the more a technology
depends on the scarcity prices and is aﬀected by the price cap looked: The shortfall of total
costs is 13% for base plants, 30% for storage, 65% for peak plants and 95% for demand
reduction measures. Energy prices are no longer suﬃcient to justify any investment into
capacities, which is described as 'missing money' problem in the literature (see section 2).
Hence, the price-capped 'energy only' market is clearly not a sustainable setupwhich is
the reason for policy makers to consider market interventions like capacity mechanisms
that are discussed next.
Total A. Pure 'energy only' B. Price-capped 'energy
costs market only' marketa
Revenues Shortfall Revenues Shortfall
eM eM eM eM eM
Base 20,595 20,595 0 17,849 2,747
Storage 1,309b 1,309 0 914 394
Peak 635 636 0 223 413
Dem. red. 41 41 0 2 39
a
Price capped at marginal costs of peak technology (e/MWh 100)
b
Storage covers variable costs for base technology generation that is used to ﬁll-up the reservoir
Note: Numbers might not add up due to rounding
Table 3: Revenues and cost coverage in 'energy only' markets
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3.3 Generic capacity mechanisms
To analyze the eﬀect of capacity mechanisms on cost coverage and the generation portfolio,
we stick to the situation with a price-cap on electricity wholesale prices as described in
Case B. If the price ceiling is equal to the variable costs of the peak technology, a simple
capacity mechanism would be a payment in the magnitude of the ﬁxed costs of peak plants
(the cheapest plant technology in terms of ﬁxed costs).
In table 4, the eﬀects of two alternative designs of such capacity payments are shown.
Case C assumes that all technologies qualify to receive a uniform capacity payment of
e/MW 50,000.5 The cost-eﬃcient technology portfolio (after capacity payments) equals
the portfolio in the 'energy only' market. Remarkably, also the size of the storage reservoir
equals the solution in the case above. This contradicts a possible ﬁrst impression that
capacity payments (applying per MW turbine capacity, not per MWh reservoir size)
could induce a storage setup with large turbines and very small reservoirs. However, the
position of the storage plant in the merit order does not change and the relative cost
position compared to the adjacent peak technology stays the same, thereby resulting in
the same number of cycles (260 in this example) that are eﬃciently commercialized by
the storage plant. It does not make a diﬀerence whether additional revenues for cost
coverage stem from 17 hours with high scarcity prices or from capacity payments in the
same magnitude.
Adding up merit-order based energy prices and capacity payments, all technologies
are able to cover their costs. Cost coverage is evident for the peak plant as we assume
capacity payments in the amount of its ﬁxed costs. For storage and the base technology,
the payment covers only part of the ﬁxed costs; at the same time, their annual run time is
longer and they can still earn part of their ﬁxed costs by selling energy at the price set by
the peak plant. In sum, the price-capped energy market with uniform capacity payments
for all plant technologies (Case C) is a sustainable solution.
C. Price-capped energy market with capacity
payments including storage
Capacity Reservoir Total costs Revenues Cap. Payment Shortfall
GW GWh eM eM eM eM
Base 54.90 20,595 17,849 2,745 0
Storage 7.88 45.96 1,309a 914 394 0
Peak 8.25 635 223 413 0
Dem. red. 2.67 41 -92b 133 0
D. Price-capped energy market with capacity
payments excluding storage
Capacity Reservoir Total costs Revenues Cap. Payment Shortfall
GW GWh eM eM eM eM
Base 58.86 21,426 18,483 2,943 0
Storage 0 0    
Peak 12.17 1,237 628 609 0
Dem. red. 2.67 41 -92b 133 0
a
Storage covers variable costs for base technology generation that is used to ﬁll-up the reservoir
b
Negative revenues occur as demand reductions at negative prices are oﬀered to receive the capacity payment
Note: Price capped at marginal costs of peak technology (e/MWh 100), uniform capacity payments for all technologies, set according to
ﬁxed costs of peak technology (e/MW 50k). Numbers might not add up due to rounding
Table 4: Capacities, costs and revenues under two capacity mechanisms
As mentioned in the introduction, storage diﬀers from other plant technologies by a
fundamental operational restriction: Power generation is only possible if the reservoir
5In the case of demand reductions, the capacity payment can be interpreted as a payment per MW that is
made to certain customers that agree to have their demand reduced in super-peak hours.
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€M 
Energy costs 
Capacity costs 
 +124   +0 
22,704 
19,019 
3,685 
22,580 
18,895 
3,685 
22,580 
22,580 
A: 'energy only' 
market 
C: Capacity 
payments incl. 
storage 
D: Capacity 
payments excl. 
storage 
Figure 2: Total costs of 'energy only' market and capacity payment systems
ﬁll-level allows it, e.g., if suﬃcient water is available in the upper basin of a pumped-
hydro plant. Consequently, the qualiﬁcation of storage plants for a capacity mechanism
is not self-evident: On the one hand, regulators could decide to exclude storage plants
de jure from payments if they are unable to meet some availability criterion. On the
other hand, a variety of speciﬁc mechanism design parameters might discriminate stor-
age plants compared to thermal units in a way that they are de facto excluded from
capacity paymentswhich is discussed in detail in the next section. Within the scope
of the numerical example, we therefore also analyze the case of capacity payments that
are available to thermal technologies but not to storage; the situation is summarized as
Case D in table 4. Given the present cost parameters, a capacity payment just for base
and peak plants causes storage to drop completely out of the generation portfolio (i.e.,
the portfolio that is cost-eﬃcient after capacity payments). To put it diﬀerently, such
'discriminating' capacity payments make any investment into the non-qualifying storage
technology unproﬁtable. The resulting plant park without storage is given in table 4; the
remaining technologies are able to cover their total costs.
In sum, three of the considered setups (Cases A, C, D) allow market participants to
cover their costs and could therefore be sustainably implemented. The calculations il-
lustrated, though, that capacity payments aﬀect the generation mix if payments are not
accessible for storage. The total system costs of the three alternatives are compared in
ﬁgure 2, underlining that a capacity payment-induced change of the generation portfo-
lio also has welfare implications: 'Discriminatory' capacity payments lead to an inferior
generation mix, which increases social costs. Consequently, the possibility that capac-
ity mechanisms discriminate storage plants calls for a more detailed analysis, which is
provided in the next section.
4 Setup of capacity mechanisms
We have shown that the participation of pumped storages in capacity mechanisms aﬀects
the total system costs (cf. ﬁgure 2). In practice there is typically no direct exclusion of
pumped storages from capacity payments. But in some cases the speciﬁc design of the
capacity mechanism might prevent their participation. Hence, it is required to have a
closer look at speciﬁc design parameters of capacity mechanisms that might exclude (or
at least discriminate) pumped storages.
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4.1 Design parameters and implications for storage
There are already several good studies covering issues on the design and implications
of the implementation of capacity mechanisms (e.g., Battle and Rodilla 2010, Cramton
and Ockenfels 2012, Joskow 2006 and Süßenbacher et al. 2011). Based on the existing
literature and the practical experience that have been made with the implementation of
concrete capacity mechanisms, we focus our analysis on those design parameters which
are particularly relevant for pumped storages as summarized in ﬁgure 3. However, in the
following we will ﬁrst refer to the classiﬁcation of capacity mechanisms and possible types
of the concrete capacity product as these are fundamental design aspects even if those
have no speciﬁc meaning for pumped storages. After that we will describe each speciﬁc
parameter mentioned in ﬁgure 3 in more detail and explain its implications for pumped
storages.
The relevant literature distinguishes often between price-ﬁxed and quantity-ﬁxed ca-
pacity mechanisms. Battle and Rodilla (2010, p. 7170) argue that such a classiﬁcation
translates into "determining whether the regulator's main objective has been to ensure
a certain quantity of the 'reliability product' or to administratively set a price for the
product itself." The purpose of price-based mechanisms is to provide a suﬃcient ﬁnancial
investment incentive to maintain security of supply on an adequate level. Power pro-
ducers receive these administrative payments, also well known as 'capacity payments',
in addition to their income generated in the spot, intraday and other markets. In con-
trast, in quantity-based mechanisms the regulator does not ﬁx the price but the installed
electricity capacity that has to be provided by market participants. Besides the capac-
ity market with ﬁxed demand-curve, quantity-based mechanisms also include capacity
options. Whether a mechanism is price-based or quantity-based, however, has no direct
eﬀect for the participation or discrimination of pumped storages for itself.
But the concrete capacity product plays a major role not only for the participation of
pumped storages. Deﬁning an adequate product is essential for the success or failure of
the whole capacity mechanism. There is a broad range of diﬀerent products as mentioned
for instance by Battle and Rodilla (2010, p. 7177): "ﬁxed or ﬂexible long-term energy
contracts, certiﬁcates of installed capacity, certiﬁcates of available capacity (or available
energy), certiﬁcates of a certain technology installed capacity, long-term reserves require-
ments, physical units to be operated by the system operator under certain conditions,
energy ﬁnancial contracts, etc.". As they argue, "there is a certain consensus around the
idea that the reliability product should remunerate the capability of producing energy
at 'reasonable' prices (. . . ) when the system is suﬀering a scarcity". But how should
scarcity be deﬁned or measured? In a well-functioning market energy prices should reﬂect
the marginal value of production costs and should therefore also indicate scarcity. As
energy prices are directly observable they could serve as transparent measure for scarcity
(cf. Cramton and Stoft 2007).
The following six parameters are of major importance for pumped storages:
4.1.1 Capacity types
In general, capacity can be provided by new and existing generating units, by demand-side
management (DSM) and by transmission capacity. The participation of all generating
capacities (new and old) in the capacity mechanism leads to a trade-oﬀ between new
investments and the extension of the operating lifetime of existing power plants. In some
cases this could lead to more advantageous shifts of the decommissioning of old and slow
coal-ﬁred power plants (especially if CO2-prices are low) and to a lack of investments in
new faster and more ﬂexible generation technologies like pumped storages or gas turbines
which are especially needed in renewable-dominated systems. But the discrimination of
existing resources distorts the market. On the other hand existing generation capacities
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2.  Contract duration 
3.  Determination of  
      relevant capacity 
4.  Lag period 
5.  Regional differentiation 
6.  Market share 
1.  Capacity types 
Installed capacity Peak availability General availability Hourly availability 
<1 year 3 years 5 year 1 year 10 years 
No differentiation Regionally restricted Regional bonus/malus 
No differentiation Differentiation 
New gen. capacity DSM Old gen. capacity Transmission capacity 
Hours 1 year 3 years Seasons 10 years 
Figure 3: Capacity mechanism design parameters
have strong incentives to exercise market power. As mentioned by Cramton and Stoft
(2007), large suppliers holding signiﬁcant market shares and own generation capacities
with already substantial sunk costs could aﬀect the clearing price by withholding of sup-
ply.6
Pumped storages cannot only provide 'positive' generation capacity but also 'negative'
storage capacity. Especially for new pumped storages it is particularly important to know
whether these storage units do not only receive capacity payments for the provision of
positive generation capacity but also for the possibility of energy storing. The integration
of 'negative capacity' as provided by pumped storages or demand-side management
into a capacity mechanism should in general lead to lower investment needs as there is no
longer only one reliability level but a range of reliable investment levels as mentioned by
Cramton and Stoft (2005). Consequently capacity prices or payments should decrease due
to lower needed capacity levels to secure supply in scarcity hours. Due to less remaining
'needed' generating capacity and potential lower capacity payments the integration of
DSM would perhaps lower opportunities for pumped storages to participate. But if DSM
can provide enough capacity and further investments in pumped storages are not needed
anymore this is of course a desirable (market) result and no discrimination of pumped
storages.
The integration of transmission capacity into a capacity mechanism sets signals
to place new generation at adequate places and leads therefore to a tradeoﬀ between
network expansion and new generation capacity. In the context of high wind penetration
this could lead to a choice between increasing current network capacity for having more
export capacity and the investment into new pumped storages for storing wind electricity.
But this decision does not discriminate pumped storages in general but is a desirable
result of the capacity mechanism.
6The basement of capacity prices on the actual capacity and not on the bid capacity could be one possibility
to avoid exercise market power as suggested by Cramton and Stoft (2005) as withholding of supply by suppliers
has not an increasing eﬀect on the capacity price.
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4.1.2 Contract duration7
The temporal resolution of the capacity mechanism (i.e., the duration of the 'capacity
contract') inﬂuences signiﬁcantly the long-term planning-security of potential investors.
Generator's risk exposure is higher with shorter contracts. This is especially relevant for
investments with long depreciation periods like pumped storages which have depreciation
periods of 4050 years while gas turbines only need 2025 years for amortization (Kon-
stantin, 2009). A contract duration chosen too short would therefore discriminate pumped
storages compared to less capital-intensive technologies.
Given risk-aversion, this may hold oﬀ investors. To maintain security of supply sustain-
ably, Süßenbacher et al. (2011) argue that it is necessary to provide producers long-term
predictable revenues. But as existing power plants already had sunk ﬁxed costs those
resources do not need long commitment. Cramton and Stoft (2007) argue that even a
short commitment of one year has a reducing eﬀect on a supplier's risk as he can beneﬁt
from price distribution. Furthermore the authors point out that multiple-year commit-
ment would complicate the supplier's decision making process as he has to decide to opt
out of the market for a year in which he expects lower prices for ﬁrm energy as in future.8
Hence, investors in pumped storages have a strong incentive for long contract duration
but at the same time the participation of pumped storages in the capacity mechanism has
to be ensured.
4.1.3 Determination of relevant capacity9
Besides the determination of a required capacity level it has to be clearly deﬁned how
the capacity that participates in the mechanism is measured. To choose the installed
capacity seems to be the easiest way to measure supplied capacity. In case of renewables,
though, installed generation capacity and energy production can fall apart far. In RES-
dominated systems this approach could especially cause problems when scarcity events
occur due to the lack of wind. But also for conventional power plants this measurement
does not take into account scheduled or forced outages. Furthermore, the use of installed
capacity to determine the relevant capacity' is not directly transferable to demand-side
management if participating in the mechanism. In most capacity mechanisms the deter-
mination of supplied capacity is therefore based on availabilitiesin each hour or only in
hours of peak demand. Also the determination of general mean values is conceivable.
The conditions for the qualiﬁed participation of a power plant at the capacity mech-
anism are highly relevant especially for pumped storages as those power plants cannot
produce constantly. Pumped storages value the water stored in their reservoirs by oppor-
tunity costs and produce in peak hours in which demand and prices are high. If capacity
payments are linked to general availability , pumped storages cannot participate in such
a capacity mechanism and will not receive capacity payments. Currently all of the ICAP
markets in the U.S. East Coast measure the supplied capacity by availability: a unit that
generates with an availability rate of 90% gets 90% of the ICAP pricea market de-
sign that allows almost no market participation of pumped storages. Cramton and Stoft
(2005) argue that in such market designs especially those power plants that contribute
little to reliability get high capacity payments. Hence, the usage of general availabilities
is misleading.
Another way to determine the relevant capacity is to base its calculation on peak
availability . The disregard of hours in which security of supply is less pressing allows
pumped storages to participate in the market and therefore allows investors to gain their
7Cramton and Stoft (2007) refer to this aspect as 'commitment period'.
8This applies only in a capacity mechanism in which not only the installed capacity but also the amount
of energy produced during periods of scarcity is paid.
9Cramton and Stoft (2005) refer to this aspect as 'product measurement'.
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investment costs. Diﬀerent ways to measure availability for new generation capacities
which have no historical production time series are possible.
4.1.4 Lag Period
Battle and Rodilla (2010) deﬁne the lag period as the "time duration between the mo-
ment the commitment of deliverability is signed and the moment the product has to be
delivered". As the lag period determines implicitly which new investments may partici-
pate in the mechanism this parameter is only (but highly) relevant for the construction
of new power plants. Cramton and Stoft (2007), who developed a capacity market design
for hydro-dominated Colombia, state that capacity procurement in advance allows new
projects to compete before entering the marketand before signiﬁcant costs are sunk.
They argue that a long lag period has several beneﬁcial eﬀects. On the one hand a long
lag period increases competition: the higher the lag period, the more (types of) power
plants are able to participate; those new resources entering the market set a 'meaningful'
capacity price. The authors state that a price set by existing power plants would be
wrong due to sunk costs and market power. On the other hand, a long lag period has
a dampening eﬀect on boom-bust-cycles which are typical for investments in electricity
markets.
Construction times vary greatly among power plant types. While large thermal power
plants like lignite or hard coal are characterized by long construction periods, gas turbines
and renewables can often be constructed in less than two years. In contrast, building a
pumped storage takes 612 years due to long authorization periods (because of their
impact on the nature) and long construction periods (because of major civil works for
dams etc.). If the lag period is chosen too short, the incentive to invest into power
plants with long authorization/construction times, such as pumped storages, is low due
to the corresponding higher price uncertainty. As stated above, the lag period inﬂuences
the competitive pressure: In the context of large pumped storages, Battle and Rodilla
(2010) argue that a short lag period of e.g., three years with short-term contracts makes
the participation of large pumped storages in the capacity mechanism nearly impossible,
while long-term contracts combined with a long lag period of seven years 'make life easier'
for investments in pumped storages. For hydro-dominated Colombia, Cramton and Stoft
(2007) suggest auction periods of 4 yearsbut give the investors of large hydro projects
the opportunity to lock-in the 4-year-ahead auction price (100% or a fraction of its energy
delivered) up to seven years ahead. Thus the reduced risk makes investment in long-term
capacity projects like pumped storages more attractive to investors.
4.1.5 Regional diﬀerentiation
Typically, capacity mechanisms focus primarily on the security of supply. In a system with
network congestion, though, a capacity mechanism could also be used to set adequate local
investment signalsprovided that there is enough liquidity in the market and no potential
exercise of market power. If participating capacity types exclude network expansion,
local investment signals can be set by a regional diﬀerentiation of capacity payments or
by the application of diﬀerent capacity zones. However, the regional diﬀerentiation of
capacity mechanisms bears the risk of market power and illiquidity if areas are chosen
too small. While gas turbines are generally not tied to a speciﬁc location, the same does
not apply to pumped storages which depend on suitable topographical and geological
conditions. In extreme cases a slight change of the borders of capacity zones implies
that a speciﬁc pumped storage investment is no longer attractive. Besides the regionally
restricted capacity markets also regional bonus-malus-systems are conceivable.
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Electricity Total generation Pumped storage As % of Number of pumped
market capacity (MW) capacity (MW) total mix storage plants
Irelanda 6,585 292 4.4 1
PJMb 170,481c 5,493 3.2 5
Spain 100,560 5,347 5.3 17
a
Republic of Ireland
b
Including the integration of the ATSI zone
c
Average oﬀered supply in summer 2011
Table 5: Pumped-storage capacity in selected markets
(source: PJM 2011b, SONI 2011, Red Eléctrica de Espana 2012, Eurelectric 2011)
4.1.6 Market share
While it has nothing to do with the setting of adequate investment incentives for new
capacities, regulators might choose to condition payments on the market share of a gen-
erator, in order to achieve a less concentrated market and to improve the competitive
situation for smaller investors.10 Especially in countries like Germany, where all pumped
storages belong to only a few large companies, such an approach seems to be problem-
atic as smaller investors tend to build rather less capital-intensive generation capacities
like gas turbines. However, recently also small utilities consider the new build of storage
plants, driven by local authorities to invest into renewable capacities (Steﬀen 2012).
Many more design parameters exist that are also highly relevant for the design of the
'right' capacity mechanism like the question about auction vs. bilateral contracts and
how the capacity product is purchased (centralized vs. bilateral). Closely related to this
question is an adequate auction design.11 However, these make no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
for storage plants as compared to other technologies.
4.2 International case studies
Building on the theoretical discussion of design parameters, we now analyze the current
situation for storage plants in selected electricity markets which have already implemented
capacity mechanisms. We focus on Ireland, PJM and Spain as those markets have signif-
icant pumped hydro storage capacity as shown in table 5.
To illustrate the diﬀerences between the capacity mechanisms, we classify all selected
mechanisms along the design parameters described in the previous section (see ﬁgure 4).
After a short description of the capacity mechanism we highlight speciﬁc conditions for
storage plants if available and show the implications for pumped storages resulting from
the speciﬁc capacity mechanism.
4.2.1 Ireland
The Irish Single Electricity Market is organized as mandatory gross pool. Generation
units are dispatched centrally. To ensure long-term system reliability, the regulator CNE
introduced administrative capacity payments. The calculation of the capacity payments
is based on the capacity requirement of the whole system and the annualized ﬁxed costs12
of the 'cheapest' new peak load power plant, the 'Best New Entry'. The capacity required
10For instance, it has been proposed in Germany to limit a power plant support program to plant owners
with a German market share in power generation below 5% (cf. Bundesregierung 2011). However, the proposal
was not implemented.
11See e.g.,Battle and Rodilla (2010) for discussion.
12Reduced by the expected revenues from the energy and ancillary service markets
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Hourly availability 
 
<1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 year 
 
1 year 
 
10 years 
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Regionally restricted 
 
Regional bonus/malus 
 
No differentiation 
 
Differentiation 
 
New gen. capacity 
 
DSM 
 
Old gen. capacity 
 
Transmission capacity 
 
Hours 
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3 years 
 
Seasons 
 
10 years 
 
b 
a Includes also capacities not located in PJM market area   b only capacity > 50 MW  
a a a 
c 
c 3 year contract duration is possible if the size of the new capacity is significant 
Figure 4: Classiﬁcation of markets along design parameters
is determined based on forecasted generator availabilities (including both scheduled and
forced outages) and a demand forecast for one year. By comparing the resulting loss
of load expectation with the applicable security standard for Ireland, the system oper-
ator determines the missing or excess amount of generation capacity to meet demand
within the security standard. Besides existing and new generation units also demand side
management and transmission capacities can receive capacity payments.
To set capacity payments, the annual payment sum is ﬁrst split into monthly capacity
period payments based on weighting factors, which ensure that particularly in months
with high load there are also high capacity payments. Those monthly payments are then
further divided into three separate components for generators (see ﬁgure 5): a ﬁxed, a
variable and an ex-post component. The ﬁrst 30% of the monthly payment are allocated
to the trading periods (which are the hours of a month) in the previous year by using ﬁxed
capacity payment weighting factors13. Another 40% of the monthly capacity payment are
variable and is proﬁled to trading periods by using loss of load probabilities (LOLP).
In contrast to the previous described capacity payment types, the remaining 30% of the
monthly capacity payment are determined ex-post after the capacity period. Their hourly
allocation is therefore based on ex-post LOLP (cf. SEM 2011).
Capacity payments for thermal units are based on hourly availability proﬁles that are
calculated based on the historical forced outage rates over ﬁve years. Where such data is
not available, mean values for the corresponding generator unit technology are used (e.g.,
in case of new generation units). The (interim) capacity margin has to be determined
to deduct the forecast availability for each trading period h (hour) within the relevant
capacity periods. To calculate the capacity margin the forecasted availabilities of the
generator units, the interconnectors and wind are summed up before the load forecast
value is deducted. The forecast availability of a total generation site then corresponds
to the summed forecast availabilities of all units belonging to the generation site. The
capacity margins of the generation sites, which are necessary to determine the forecast
availabilities, are then determined by the system operator as follows:
13Fixed Capacity Payment Weighting Factors = "forecast demand in that trading period relative to the
minimum forecast demand in the relevant capacity period" (cf. SEM 2011 )
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Annual capacity payment sum 
 Divided into 12 capacity period payment sums 
Capacity period 
fixed sum 
• Profiled into hourly 
trading periods 
• Determined before 
start of the year 
30% 
Capacity period 
variable sum 
• Profiled into hourly 
trading periods 
• Determined before 
start of capacity period 
40% 30% 
Capacity period 
variable sum 
• Profiled into hourly 
trading periods 
• Determined ex-post 
after capacity period 
Figure 5: Components of capacity payments in Ireland(source: SEM 2011)
For conventional units14, the capacity margin is calculated by the usage of historical
forced outage factors and temperature correction factors which are, in turn, determined
by referring to the historical relationship between temperature and the generator unit's
availability.
The capacity margin of energy-limited generator units like pumped storage units is
particular considered and not based on any historical data. To determine the capacity
margin of a generation site containing pumped storage units, the determination of those
trading periods h within each trading day is necessary where the capacity margin is min-
imal. After that the optimized output from each speciﬁc generation site is incrementally
increased by (1 MW)/(number of Trading Periods of Minimum Interim Margin) until a
further increase would lead to a violation of a unit's technical capability and as long as
there is suﬃcient remaining energy at the generation site to do this.15 After updating
the remaining energy for the speciﬁc generation site, the interim margin in all trading
periods is calculated new and the trading periods where the (interim) capacity margin is
minimal are determined again. This procedure is continued as long as there is remain-
ing energy in any generation site containing pumped storage units16. See SEM (2012)
for a more detailed description of the determination of capacity margins including forced
outage rates.
Although the dispatch of pumped storages depends on hourly electricity prices at ﬁrst
sight (as for all generating capacities), the separate estimation of the hourly availabilities
of pumped storages in Ireland takes into account that the dispatch of pumped storages
further depends on the current ﬁll levelwhile the dispatch of thermal power plants is
normally not limited by the availability of fuel. But due to long investment periods the
short lag period poses a relatively high risk for new pumped storages to enter the market.
Additionally the uncertainty of the potential capacity income will be increased by the high
granularity of the capacity mechanism. But in summary there is no direct or indirect (e.g.,
by imposing a minimum of availability) exclusion of pumped storages in the Irish capacity
mechanism design. It should be emphasized that Ireland only holds one hydro pumped
storage and that there is not much further hydropower potential that could be developed
(cf. Eurelectric 2011, p. 14).
14More precisely: for units other than autonomous generator units, demand site units, wind power units,
interconnector units and interconnector residual capacity units (cf. SEM 2012, M.20-M.21
15If not, the output is only increased as high as (technically) possible
16and energy-limited generator units
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4.2.2 PJM
The PJM Interconnection LLC operates as independent system operator at the U.S. East
Coast a centrally dispatched wholesale electricity market as well as several further markets
including an intraday market, a capacity market and markets for transmission rights and
ancillary services. In the delivery year 2007/2008, PJM completely redesigned the capac-
ity market and introduced the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) to increase performance.
According to a load serving entity's share in PJM's peak load, the load serving entities
can satisfy their capacity obligation either through own facilities, bilateral contracts, their
participation in the RPM capacity market or through the 'FRR Alternative'17. Several
capacity types can participate in the capacity market: Generation resources, load manage-
ment resources, energy eﬃciency resources and qualiﬁed transmission upgrades18. Beside
existing and new resources also resources not located in the PJM area can participate
under certain conditions. Planned generation resources can participate if their start date
of interconnection service is on or before the start of the delivery year.
PJM's territory is divided into 25 location deliverability areas. For each area, the
demand is determined by a Variable Resource Requirement (VRR)19 curve which is based
on the cost of new entry (CONE), a target level of reserve and expected revenue oﬀset
from energy- and ancillary services. The RPM deﬁnes one occurrence in ten years as
reliability requirement. Capacity requirements are determined and a ﬁrst auction is held
three years ahead of the delivery year. To deal with potential changes in PJM's capacity
requirement, three further incremental auctions follow to provide additional capacity (20
months, 10 months, and 3 months ahead). With 'new entry pricing' the RPM gives new
planned generation resources of signiﬁcant size a special investment incentive. To increase
the security of investment, new generation resources have the possibility to receive the
capacity price of the initial auction for the next three years under certain circumstances
(cf. PJM 2012).
The reliability value of a generation resource or its unforced capacity20 depends on two
variables: its installed capacity and its equivalent demand forced outage rate (EFORd).
The installed capacity is based on the summer net dependable rating and gives the number
of megawatts which can be delivered by the unit at the time of PJM's peak load. EFORd
gives "the probability that a generating unit will not be available due to forced outages
or forced deratings when there is a demand on the unit to generate" (PJM, 2012, p. 8).
For the calculation of EFORd the outage data of the latest ﬁve years is used or if not
available class average EFORd21.
Speciﬁc rules determine the net capability for pumped storage units. While the de-
termination of their summer net capability is also based on operational data (or if not
available on test results), those can be taken at any time during the year (once each de-
livery year). The same data can be used for the determination of summer and winter net
capability. Also the duration of the veriﬁcation test is shorter (cf. PJM 2010, PJM 2011a,
PJM 2012).
PJM's determination of the relevant capacity has no speciﬁc impacts on the dispatch or
the participation in capacity market for pumped storages. As mentioned in subsection 4.1,
long lag periods are advantageous for new pumped storages as their investment periods are
long. PJM's locational diﬀerentiation sets adequate locational investment signals. When
17Load serving entities can choose the option to submit a FRR capacity plan and meet a ﬁxed capacity
resource requirement while the capacity resource in the RPM is variable.
18From delivery years 2007/2008 through 2011/2012 also 'Interruptible Load for Reliability Resources' could
participate.
19PJM (2012, p. 162) describes the VRR curve deﬁning "the maximum price for a given level of capacity
resource commitment relative to the applicable reliability requirement".
20The unforced capacity considers forced outages and forced deratings.
21See PJM 2011a for a further description of the determination of EFORd and equations.
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building capacity zones this should in general also be done with respect to potential
investment in pumped storages at zonal borders as pumped storages investments depend
strongly on the location. Allocating a potential pumped storage site to a capacity zone
with lower capacity prices could in the worst case lead to a lack of investments in pumped
storages.
4.2.3 Spain
The Spanish capacity mechanism distinguishes between two types of capacity payments:
payments for availability and payments for the setting of investment incentives ('Pagos
par capacidad') (cf. Ministerio de industria, turismo y comercio 2007). Although the
payments for availability, which diﬀer along generation technologies, are anchored by law
they are not implemented in practice yet. In contrast, annual capacity payments for
investments are paid to new generation capacities greater than 50 MW for their ﬁrst ten
years of operation22. Existing generation capacities do not receive capacity payments. To
determine the annual payments, the system operator calculates a reserve margin index
('indice de cobertura') by dividing the total available capacity by the peak demand. The
investment incentive is described as a decreasing function of the reserve index (RI) with
an optimal value between 1 and 1.1. The annual capacity payment decreases when the
RI exceeds a value of 1.1; no capacity payments are paid if the RI is higher than 1.29.
The Spanish capacity mechanism diﬀers from the previously described mechanisms
in several points: Capacity payments are only paid to new capacities and all generation
technologies receive the same payments per installed megawatt. The determination of
available capacity is very simple as it corresponds to the installed capacity of the speciﬁc
power plant. Special aspects (e.g., no general availability as the hourly production depends
on the reservoir ﬁll-level or pumping) are not considered. While the long contract duration
is advantageous for investments in pumped storages, the short lag period of one year is
disadvantageous. Nevertheless, Spain has currently licensed to build new pumped storages
with a total installed pumping capacity of 2,424 MW (cf. Eurelectric 2011).
5 General principles and conclusion
The capacity mechanisms implemented in diﬀerent countries diﬀer considerably, despite
the common goal to secure an adequate amount of generation capacity at reasonable
costs. The calculations presented in this paper demonstrate that capacity payments are
able to prevent power plant investments from falling short of their costsand at the same
time, total system costs increase if storage is excluded from such payments. A number
of design parameters determine whether storage plants are able to de facto participate in
capacity mechanisms, and diﬀerent decisions have been made in existing mechanisms. It
goes without saying that the speciﬁc conditions in each market require somewhat tailored
approacheshowever, we believe that three general principles can be summed up to ensure
the storage-compatibility of capacity mechanisms:
 Stable, long-term horizon: While power generation in general is a capital-
intensive business, this is especially true for pumped-hydro storage. To stimulate
investment into large-scale dam projects, long contract durations for capacity remu-
neration are required, such that payments are regarded as reliable income stream
by investors. Besides long commitment periods, the prolonged permission and con-
struction time of storage plants should be taken into account when lag periods for
capacity tenders are decided upon. No least investors have to be able to rely on
22They are also payed to existing power plants with signiﬁcant additional investment activities (e.g., ﬁtting
of ﬂue-gas desulfurization on coal plants), cf. Ministerio de industria, turismo y comercio 2007.
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the sustainability of capacity mechanism ruleswithout a stable regulatory envi-
ronment, storage projects will always loose out against less capital-intensive tech-
nologies.
 Technology-speciﬁc availability measurement: Technology-neutrality is a salient
feature of text book case capacity mechanisms: All available contributions to ensure
generation adequacy (including demand side management or transmission capaci-
ties) should be part of capacity mechanisms in order to achieve an eﬃcient capital
allocation. In practice, criteria have to be deﬁned to decide which speciﬁc units are
allowed to participate, with unit availability being of vital importance. The spe-
ciﬁc availability indicators and calculation procedures have to take the diﬀerences
between technologies into account. For pumped-storage systems, consequently, op-
erational restrictions due to reservoir ﬁll levelsat peak load hoursshould be the
determining factor.
 Large geographical scope: By their nature, storage plants are geographically
restricted to sites with appropriate conditions in terms of topography and geology.
Consequently, the regional structure of capacity mechanisms is much more relevant
for storage plants than for thermal units. This not only applies to regional factors
within a mechanism, but also to the frontier of the overall system: If power plants
are synchronized to a speciﬁc power system but located beyond a capacity regime
border, this might impact storage plants that cannot be built at the other side of the
border, very much in contrast to thermal plants. This should be carefully taken into
account in Europe, where several distinct national capacity mechanisms are being
discussed while large pumped-hydro potential lies 'next to' these markets in Alpine
countries.
In sum, capacity mechanisms are an important way to ensure generation adequacychosen
by regulators in many markets today and possibly even more widely implemented in the
future. The analysis showed that it is possible to include storage plants into those mech-
anisms, achieving in principal an eﬃcient generation portfolio. Concerning the detailed
implementation of capacity mechanisms, we illustrated that several principles have to be
met in order to achieve storage-compatibilitythey should become an essential feature of
future mechanisms in countries where pumped-hydro storage is an option.
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